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BOOK REVIEW
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
By William F. Duker
Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1980. 349 pages.
ISBN 0-313-22264-9
Reviewed by John Code Mowbray*
William F. Duker, who has written extensively on legal history, has
done an excellent job in encapsulating the writ of habeas corpus in a
313-page text, supplemented by extensive footnotes. Habeas corpus,
well-known but enveloped in a web of ancient procedure, is properly
characterized as the modem "structural reform mechanism of the crim-
inal justice system"'; however, the nature and scope of this remedy has
varied with the times. The Great Writ originally functioned to bring a
person before the court. Only later did it evolve into an inquiry into
the lawfulness of detention. The common law history, illuminated with
yearbook case histories, was finally crystallized in the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679.2
The primary American reference is Article I of the Constitution of
the United States which states:
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion and Public Safety may
require it.
3
The author impressively argues that in the context of history, this legal
procedure, which protects individual liberty against oppressive confine-
ment by government, rested principally with the states. This constitu-
tional prohibition precluded federal encroachment of the state courts'
inherent power to issue writs. However, the Judiciary Act of 17894 did
provide for a federal writ of habeas corpus, and this prerogative writ
was confirmed by Chief Justice Marshall in the landmark case, Exparte
Bollman and Ex parte Swartwout.5 Prior to the Civil War the states
had issued federal writs on persons held in federal custody, military
and judicial. The Supreme Court held in 1871 that the states may not
issue writs of habeas corpus for persons in federal custody because to
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1. W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CoRPus 3 (1980).
2. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c.2.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cL2.
4. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. (1976)).
5. 8 U.S. 75 (4 Cranch) (1807).
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do so would interfere with the authority of the United States.6 In Tar-
ble's Case, the Court held that state courts had a right to issue the writ
unless it appeared that the petitioner was detained "under the author-
ity, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States."7
After the Civil War, the plenary power to issue the writ shifted from
the state courts to the federal courts, for although state courts could not
question federal detention, federal courts would now review any state
detention. Federal review for state prisoners is traced to the federal
Habeas Corpus Act of 18678 which authorized federal relief "in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in viola-
tion of the Constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States
.... "I Congress may not have understood the impact of this expan-
sive language which permitted federal court review by lower federal
courts, as well as by the Supreme Court.
This 1867 legislation was used to test the validity of the Reconstruc-
tion Acts by a military detainee scheduled for trial by a military com-
mission. In Ex parte McCardle,'° the Court, in ruling on a motion to
dismiss, held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and com-
mented on the breadth of the new legislation: "It brings within the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every pos-
sible case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution,
treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction.""II Three
weeks after oral argument on the merits and while the case was under
submission, Congress passed an amendment repealing the appellate ju-
risdiction of the Court under the 1867 Act. President Andrew Johnson
vetoed the bill, claiming that it would "eventually sweep away every
check or arbitrary and unconstitutional legislation."' 2 Congress, how-
ever, overrode Johnson's veto. The veto had, however, allowed debate
on the measure. Senator Turnbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, who had been responsible for the passage of the 1867 Act
in the Senate (he was also counsel for the government in McCardle),
argued that while the decision in McCardle was pending before the
Supreme Court there was no case before the Supreme Court under the
1867 Act. 3 The Court then ruled that the repealing amendment was
valid and dismissed McCardle for lack of jurisdiction, noting neverthe-
less that the Court still retained its original habeas jurisdiction.
The importance of the writ in subjugating the military to civil au-
6. 80 U.S. 397 (13 Wall.) (1871).
7. Id. at 409.
8. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
9. Id.
10. 73 U.S. 318 (6 Wall.) (1867).
11. Id. at 325-26.
12. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2094 (1868).
13. Id. at 2096.
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thority was eloquently expressed in Duncan v. Kahanamoku 4 by Jus-
tice Murphy, who admonished in a concurring opinion: "But milita-
rism is not our way of life. It is to be used only in the most extreme
circumstances. Moreover, we must be on constant guard against an
excessive use of any power, military or otherwise, that results in the
needless destruction of our rights and liberties."' 5 The writ enforces
the constitutional rights of the individual by shielding liberty against
overreaching by any organ of the state.
A constitutional history of habeas corpus should have included dis-
cussion of United States v. Hayman, 6 which reversed the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals that had held that this federal statutory post-convic-
tion remedy (28 U.S.C. § 2255)' 7 was an unconstitutional "suspension"
of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court approved the use of a section
2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence as a practical
device to avoid the labyrinth of ancient collateral attacks. If this statu-
tory procedure is inadequate or ineffective, resort to habeas corpus may
still be had.
After 1925 the Supreme Court had principally exercised discretion-
ary review over subordinate federal and state courts. Under the 1867
expansion,'" the federal writ has permitted broad monitoring of state
cases, especially criminal convictions. After a state appeal and certio-
rari to the Supreme Court has been taken, the convicted defendant may
next seek habeas corpus relief in the state courts. In several states this
post-conviction collateral attack has been standardized by rule or stat-
ute. Certiorari to the Supreme Court from a state court denial may be
sought. Thereafter, the state prisoner may seek federal habeas corpus
relief 9 in a federal district court and seek appeal and certiorari from a
denial. The one-judge, federal district court reversal of a multi-judge,
state appellate tribunal has increased tension in federal-state judicial
relations, and as a result, the present Supreme Court has sought the
curtailment of the federal writ.
Comity between federal and state courts dictated that federal
habeas be available only after all available state remedies, trial and
appellate, seeking direct or collateral relief, had been exhausted. The
"exhaustion doctrine" has been justified on the grounds that it gives the
state court the initial opportunity to evaluate the petitioner's claims.
This requirement, however, impairs the promptness required of the
remedy by the common law. Since the prerequisite of certiorari review
from the state proceedings has been eliminated,2' the petitioner need
14. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
15. Id. at 335.
16. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
18. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
20. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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only exhaust direct or collateral review, not both.2' The exhaustion
requirement is not absolute, for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 224122 could be used to enforce a speedy trial challenge to a pending
state charge. 3 In a unique twist of federal habeas corpus review of a
state conviction based upon faulty eye-witness identification, the Court
shifted focus to the application of a 1966 amendment to the statutory
exhaustion requirement24 that bound the federal court to a state trial
court's or appellate court's factual determination made upon an ade-
quate record."5 Wainwright v. Sykes, 26 in which federal habeas was un-
available because the claimed error had not been raised first in the state
courts, is but another procedural hurdle designed to emphasize that the
state courts are the principal forums for review of state criminal convic-
tions. This valid objective has also the obvious concomitant, though
probably unfounded, expectation that the number of prisoners' peti-
tions-approximately one-sixth of the total federal court civil
caseload-may diminish. -The rise in the number of prisoner petitions
from 300 in 1936 to 23,000 in 1979 may be influencing judicial interpre-
tation.
The author notes the judicial retrenchment on the writ. In Stone v.
Powell,2 7 the Court excised the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
and required that evidence acquired as a result of an illegal search or
seizure be excluded from federal habeas corpus relief. The Stone opin-
ion intimated that "innocence" was relevant to the grant of a federal
habeas corpus petition, but the author notes that this dictum was quali-
fled by the Court's conclusion in Rose v. Mitchell.2" Although the au-
thor is correct, the habeas petitioner in Rose did not obtain relief, and
Justice Powell's concurring opinion clearly favors return of habeas re-
view to an earlier day when little more than jurisdiction could be ex-
amined. It must be remembered that Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte29 was the ominous precursor of
Stone v. Powell.30
The author also contends that the present Supreme Court has un-
necessarily limited federal habeas corpus. In Bell v. Wofish, 3 the
Court, on a federal habeas corpus petition of federal pretrial detainees,
reversed the lower courts' findings that conditions of confinement 32 vio-
lated fundamental protections of those presumed innocent. Bell is
21. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1952).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
23. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
25. Sumner v. Mata, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981).
26. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
27. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
28. 443 U.S. 545 (1979). Five Justices made up the majority in Rose.
29. 412 U.S. 218, 252 (1973).
30. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
31. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
32. The Court questioned but did not decide whether the writ may be used to challenge condi-
tions of confinement as distinct from its duration. Id. at 526 n.6.
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unique because the federal courts fail to exercise even minimal supervi-
sion over the courts' prisoners-pretrial detainees-to establish any
standard for body cavity searches. The author's analysis that the Court
not only denies relief but also at the same time denies the availability of
a remedy does have support in the recent cases.
The scope of judicial review is carefully synthesized from its early
origins, exclusively limited to jurisdiction, to its present-day posture as
a post-conviction remedy available to the state or federal prisoner for a
violation of a federally protected constitutional right. This text com-
bines easy reading with access to painstaking research and is worth-
while reading for any judge, lawyer, or scholar interested in habeas
corpus.

